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The 1996 FAIR Act: exported, depesidiog upon the commodity.
A M in Unfortunately, no one was in a position to pfodictNew uireciion in Asian economic crisis, which seriousiy
Fanrt Policy Of e impacted the ability of many of our Pest customers
Paj|0<| Experiment to import grain. This crisis reduced their effective
demand, or their wants backed up by purchasing
power. Although the desire was stii! there, the
decline in the value of their cumencies relative to
Gary Tayior the U.S. doliar priced foreign buyers out ofIhe
Assistant Profassor market. This r^uction in export sales further
increased domestic grain stocks and put additional
This is the first of two articles examining the downward pressure on prices,
problems of the economicsof agriculture, the 1996
Farm Bill, and some of the solutions being Economic theory tells us that, In the short run, as
suggested to solve the perceived problems in the price of a good decreases, the quantity
agncultural policy. demanded v*rill increase. However, this isgenerally
not the case with grain and food products in the
The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform domestic market. The inelastic demand for food,
Act of 1996was supposed to be a watershed event i.e. relatively small dianges in production levels
In U.S. agricultural policy, a move away from result in relatively large price changes, hampers
government mandated supply control programs extra domestic sales. Although food is a necessity
toward a more market oriented fann policy. for life, the U.S. peculation in general is not
Producers would make their production and underfed. The result Istliateven dramatic changes
marieeting decisions basedonthe supply and in food prices have littie effect on consumption
demand conditions ofthe market rather than the levels. We maychange the mix of products we
artificial price signals ofsupport prices, loan rates, consume but we don't generally reduce or increase
and loandeficiency payments. The crop insurance our consumption levels based on price changes,
program was modified and the non-recourse This leaves the export marl^t and non-food uses of
marketing assistance loan program would be left in agricultural products todispose oftheexcess
place to provide a safety net in case oflow prices production. When the export maf1<et also contracts,
and planting flexibility wouid allow producers to lower prices and higher stocks levels are the
switch betwieen crops to maximize profitability, results,
depending upon the signals of the market.
Unfortunately, the actual results of the act fall far The second problem that farmers have to deal with
shortofthe benefits anticipated during its are the loan rate levels. Foranyproducer it is
formuiation. Excess production has continued to economically rational to produce at a loss in the
increase stocks ieveis, increasing the downward short run as long as he is covering his variable
pressure on prices. With ail grain prices low the costs of production. In ger>eral, these "out of
planting fiexasility that was to foe a boon to farmers pocker c»sts vary tietween $1,20 to $1.60 per
has beenoflittle help. Where did wego wrong? bushel for com and $2.10 to$2.50 for soytseans
(Good, 2000). With the loan rate forcom set at
TheEconomics of Agrtcul^ral Production $1 .S9/bu. and for soybeans at $5.26 (national
levels) produoers can coverfiielr variable costs and
One of the main problems was fiie over-reliance on have something left to contribute toward fixed
the export market to absorb our excess production, costs. Thus, producters make the logical decision
Generally, this would not be a problem as on and continue production. However, this is a short
average 25 to 50% of our grain production is run phenomenon. To remain in business in the
long run, all costs must ba covered. This Is the
position producers am currently facing. Forecasts
for two or three more years of low prices will force
marginai producers to re-evaluate their operations.
It is very iittely we wlil continue to see a sizeable
number of producersexitagncuiturein the nextfew
years.
This ieads to a third problem that affects
agrlcuiture. Even though we have seen the numt>ef
ofproducers decrease dramaticaliy over the last SO
years, we are stili cufttvating approximately the
sameacreage. This is the result of the adoption of
new technologies, physical and biological, that
have allowed farmers to dramatically mcrease their
productive effjciency. As famners gooutof
business, the main productive asset, ttmland, does
not iay idle. So evenas the number ofproducers
continues to decrease, total aghcuitural production
continues to increase, and the tjenefits are passed
on up the distribution chain.
In addition, the economic structure of the farming
sector contributes to this overproduction problem.
Generally, agriculture is vie\«ed as a petfectly
competitive industry. This implies that there are no
barriers to entry orexit, there is a large number of
producers, noneofwhich Is large enough to
individually affect the market; theyare price takers;
perfect information exists; and #^ey produce a
homogeneous product. Since nosingle producer
can inHuence the commodity price their logical
decision Isto produce wheretheir marginal cost of
production isequal to the marginal revenue they
receive (price of the product). This fallacy of
composition, that theactions ofan individual do not
affect the group, increases total production, driving
prices down. Escaping perfect competition is a
longstanding goal of many agricultural producers.
8y differentiating their product or developing a
degree ofsupply control producers obtain some
price settlr^ power. Escaping from this"price
taking" situation would greatly enhance producers'
opportunities to maintain profitable production
levels. Yet many producers are unable to
effectively price their products when theopportunity
anses.
Design of the 1S90 Farm Bill
Although the premise behind Freedom k> Farmwas
correct, there was a breakdown in readying Itsfinal
form. The move toward a more market-oriented
policy was a good choice eoonomrcaily, akhougb
the decision was not made by choice. These
changeswere a direct result of the Uruguay round
of the GATT negotiations and the birth of the WTO,
However, the safety net provisions that were
inciuded distorted tre market. Even though
farmers had the flexibility to switch between crops,
how manyoptions do they really have when all
commodity pricesare !oW? Their logical decision
was then to ignore the price signals offiie market,
since that was not the actual price they would
receive at the time of sale. Loan rates became a
price floor, encouraging production In excess ofthat
dictated by supply anddemandconditions. This
resulted in burgeoning stocks levels and further
downward price pressure, This also fncreased
government outlays as LDF's Increased,
Typically, government programs tend todeal with
the symptoms, rather than the causes ofproblems.
Low farm incomes and commodity prices are
merely symptoms ofthe larger problem thatexists
In agriculture, Inelastic demand. We need toface
the fact that there is a finite demand for the
agricultural commodities weproduce. Planting
fencerow to fencerow is not a viable option ifwe
want to return prices to profitable levels. The
factors thatshift demand for a product are well
known and include prices of substitute and
complementary goods, incx^me, populaticm, and
tastes and References. Sincethe U.S. population
is well fed, pricectsangesand changes In
preferences will only change the mix ofgoods we
consume, not the totalvolume. As a result, we
have generally been concerned with the population
shifter, the export market. Our International
economic development efforts around the vrorid
have focused on developing new markets by
increasing Income levels and changing tastes and
preferences In less developed countries. Wewould
like many ofthe so-called 'Third World" countries to
develop to the degree that theycan purchase or
exportgoods but not enough to become
competitors inthe export market such as Argentina
and Brazil,
It may be logically argued that most of the hunger
probtems finat exist in the world today are not
production problems butincome and distribution
problems. Given productive capacity that exists
in the U.S., Soubi America, Europe, the former
Soviet Union, and Australia the capacity to produce
enoughfood and grainto feed fiie world exists.
The problem is that itmustbe moved from the
areas of excess production to tfie deficit areas and
the capacity to payfor the products mustexist.
This would give the producers the economic signais
they need to make informed decisions regarding
what, how, and how much to produce. This
information is vital to aligning producer supply with
consumption demand. However, the one fact that
should be remembered is that achieving market
equilibrium has nothing to do with profitability.
Equilibrium only tells us that the quantity supplied is
equal to the quantity demanded. Priceand quantity
are determined but producer costs of production
will determine profitability.
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The article above laid out some of the economic
problems ofthe agricultural sector. This article will
discuss some of the options being examined to
solve the problems related to the 1996 FAIR Act.
The real problem that exists in agriculture today is
that we are expanding production at a faster rate
than demand. In 1798, the Reverend Thomas
Malthus published his seminal work "An Essay on
the Principle of Population, As ItAffects the Future
Improvement of Society." Malthus was convinced
that population growth would exceed the capacity
of the earth to produce food. Adoption of new
productive technologies has, up to this point,
proven him wrong. However, to assume that we
will be able to continue to increase production
faster than population growth would be foolhardy.
There is an upper limit to our productive capacity,
even with further technological advances. At that
point itwould appear our pricing problems would be
over. However, one would expect the more
efficient or aggressive producers to bid up the price
of land, pricing the less efficient producers out of
the market. Until then, we will continue to deal with
price fluctuations in an industry where low prices
are the norm, not the exception.
Short Term Fixes
Due to the price conditions that exist in agriculture
many producers, and policy makers, are
encouraging possible modifications to the current
farm bill to alleviate some of the financial stress in
the industry. A number of possible solutions have
been developed. A few of these options will be
examined here.
Flexible Fallow
This is one of the more popular options being
considered. This program would give each
producerthe option to idle from 0 to 30%oftheir
acreage in exchangefor higher loan rates on their
remaining production. For example, ifthe loan rate
for com was $1.89/bu., a producer choosing to idle
0% of his acres would receive that rate. However,
if he decided to idle 30% of his acres, he would be
eligible fora loan rate of$2.75/bu. This approach
would help grain producers in twoways. Their
incomes would increase and the stocks levels
would be reduced, lessening the downward
pressure on prices. However, what would our
competitors do? As prices increase due to lower
production levels in the U.S., theywould logically
respond by increasing production and making
further inroads in the export market. Depending
upon participation levels, ag businesses should not
be negatively impacted in the long run, although
there may be some short term economic hardships
in areas of high participation. A unilateral reduction
in production would be Ijeneficial in the short run
but have large, negative, long term effects. Prices
would increase due to the lower production levels
but this would encourage increased production in
other countries, increasing our competition in the
export market and putting increased dovmward
pressure on prices. Thisprogram would have the
U.S. paying the costs of the program, reducing our
production levels, and the rest ofthe world reaping
the benefits, the increased prices that would result
from this action.
The NFU Solution
The National Farmers Union has developed a plan
for the five majorgrain exporters to take 3% of their
land out of production annually until grain prices
double. This plan would have the U.S., Canada,
the EU, Argentina, and Australia take an additional
3% of their land out of production each year until
prices rise to an agreed upon level. These
countries would then monitor prices and manage
set-aside acres to maintai?i stable pnce levels.
Each country would be free to detemilne how to get
farmers to participate and countries with current
set-aside programs would increase the levels until
all participating countries had approximately equal
set-aside levels. The Canadian government would
offer farmers $40/acre to voluntarily idle land. The
slow rate of change should allow ag businesses to
adjustwith minimal difficulties. Is this a viable
solution? It does solve the problem of flexible
faiiovs; in that it is not a unllaterai program.
However, due to the different political poilciesand
goals ofthe participating countries, cooperation is
not likeiy to occur. If we can't get domestic
producers to agree on policy Issues, tKsw can we
expect an ethnically and culturally dlveiee group
such as the one belr^ proposed to agree on a
single aghcultura! strategy? However, the basic
strategy Issound. As long as production exceeds
demand, priceswill be low. Sometypeof supply
control is iikely to be necessary to get much price
Improvement, Without govemmm^t intervention this
usually comes In the form ofcrop failures in other
partsofthe world which then stimulate the export
market, y^other problem here Isslippage. Since
all countries will be setting aside their marginal
land, production decreases will be less than the
land retirement amounts. At 3% reduction
annually, Itwould take a few years to see
significant production reductions and price
Increases.
Plan &
Plan 8 is an approach developed by Dave Kiuse to
use the provisions ofthe FAIR Act In an offensive
strategy to increase a>m pricesand discourage
foreign competition inthe soybean market.
Farmers would voluntarily shift 25% of their com
acres to soybeans nejd year. Thiswould
theoretically eliminate the com carryover and yield
com pricesbetween $3 and $4^3U., depending
upon the compliance level. No LDP would be paid
on com and tils moneywould go to the additional
LDP paidon soybeans. Soybean producer income
would be protected (at the loan rate) and com
income would increase. During the next crop year
production would revert back to a more traditional
acreage split. Agricultural businesses wouid be
affected in the short run. Since fewer inputs are
needed in soybean production, there would t>e a
reduction in input purchases. This should not be a
dramatic difference. Is this a viable option?
Probably not. In orderto make the program work.
high compliance levels are required. Sincethisis a
voluntary program, there is a large incentiveto
cheat and tse a free rider. Without guarantees of
success or a penaity for non-compliance,
participation is iikety to be very low, drastically
reducing the projected impact. In addition, the U.S.
will be storing huge volumes of soybeans. This
could create storage problems for other crops and
additional problems in maintaining the condition of
the soybeans to maintain their vaiue.
There is one factor that shouid be considered in
any plan to increase farm prices and Incomes,
capitalization. The usual scenario in agriculture is
for the benefits of farm programs to t)e added to the
price ofthe productive assets we employ. The real
key is howto Increase pricesand incomes without
having the extra income absorbed by increased
costs of production.
Treating idte Problem
ifwe take an objective lookat agriculture, we can
see that the two basic problems titat we need to
deal with are die perfectlycompetitive market and
the inelastic demand for the commodities we
produce.
Inelastie Demand
The elasticity of demand refers to the relationship
between price, quantity demanded, and total
revenue. In general, the lawof demand tells us
that as price increase, less of a good will be
demanded. However, we also know that since food
is a necessity, cheaper products will be substituted
for more expensive ones and our tota! food
consumption amountstays fairly constant. Ineiastic
demand means that we get relatively large pric»
changes resulting from smaller changes in quantity
suppiied. Since this is the case, producerrevenues
ana incieased only when prices increase. On the
other hand, if demand was elastic we could
increase total revenue by decreasing prices. Since
eiasticity is determined bythe numberof substitute
goodsavailable, there isnot much that can be done
about this situation, until someone develops a
substituteforfood.
Perfect CompeWon
Perfect competition is a d^rent situation. Since
the conditions for a perfectlycompetitive ma«ket are
welldefined, they can be approadied individually.
A disclaimer is in order here. Even though the
solutions may be easy to solve in theory, reality is
an entirely different matter.
As agriculture continues to evolve we continueto
see farm numt)ers decrease and farm size
increase. Although there is still a long way to go,
over the last fifty years we have seen a drastic
reduction in the number of farms and an even
larger decline in the number ofviable, commercial
farms. As this numtjer continues to decline,
organizing the remaining producers into a cohesive
group should become easier. Acting as a group
and exerting a degree of supply control will allow
producers to escape perfect competition and
develop some price setting power. This has been
successfully accomplished in the citrus fruit industry
through marketing coops.
The second thing producers can do is differentiate
their products. As long as farmers produce
commodities instead of identifiable products, they
will remain price takers. The degree of
differentiation will then determine their ability to
charge a premium price for their production.
Purebred livestock producers have done this for
years. Other producers must developsome
identifying characteristic for theirproducts in order
to capitalize on this opportunity. Oil contentand
protein levels are two ways to differentiate grains.
In the short run, government intervention in one
form or another is likely to be necessary to maintain
farm income levels. The diverse interests involved
in agricultural policy formulation will determine the
forms and levels of support. As farm numbers
continue to decrease there will be increasing
pressure to reduce funding. All parties having an
interest in the future of agriculture should be keenly
interested in the formulation of the next farm bill.
Will it be a continued move toward a market
oriented future or a retreat into our protectionist
past? Only time will tell.
ECONOMICS COMMENTATOR
Economics Department
South Dakota State University Phone:605-688-4141
Box 504 Fax: 605-688-6386
Brookings, SD 57007-0895 E-mail: Stovef_Penny@ sdstate.edu
400cdpies ofthis newsletter were produced at a costofless than $100
November and December Workshop Opportunities
for South Dakota Farmers and Ranchers
Nov. 14 -
Nov. 16 -
Nov. 28 & 29 -
Flandreau - Grain & Livestock Outlook
Watertown - Marketing Plan Development
Faulkton - Pricing for Profit workshop
Dec. 4 &19 - Elk Point or Beresford - Intermediate Marketing
Dec. 5, 7,12 &14- Brookings - Pricing for Profit, phase 3
Dec. 11 & 18 - Clark - Pricing for Profit, phase 1
Dec. 19 - Highmore - Bootstraps
Dec. 20 - Roscoe or Hosmer-Staying in Business, Phase 1
Dec. 27 & 28 - Miller- Accounting Workshop
Contact yourlocal Extension office forspeciTic details regarding thesemeetings.
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